网络空间安全领域顶级会议之Usenix Security 2021录取目录一览

2021年网络安全领域四大顶会的论文录用均已揭晓,InForSec特整理相关信息分享给网络安全学术社区。

Usenix Security Symposium (USENIX Security), 是世界网络和系统安全领域四大顶级学术会议之一, 开始于上世纪90年代初,发表论文难度极高, 过去五年的平均录用率为17%。

USENIX Security为CCF推荐A类会议,H-5指数80,近年来它的论文录用量也呈现出明显的增长趋势,2020年共录取157篇,2021年共录取了246篇。

其中,来自中国高校、科研院所和企业界共28篇,有华人学者参与的共有78篇。 (注:数据为人工统计,如有疏漏,还请指正。)

以下为 USENIX Security 2021年录取论文列表:

论文标题作者信息第一作者单位一作单位所在国家
Effect of Mood, Location, Trust, and Presence of Others on Video-Based Social AuthenticationCheng Guo and Brianne Campbell, Clemson University; Apu Kapadia, Indiana University; Michael K. Reiter, Duke University; Kelly Caine, Clemson University Clemson University美国
‘Passwords Keep Me Safe’ – Understanding What Children Think about PasswordsMary Theofanos and Yee-Yin Choong, National Institute of Standards and Technology; Olivia Murphy, University of Maryland, College ParkNational Institute of Standards and Technology美国
On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for Hardware Security TokensKatharina Pfeffer and Alexandra Mai, SBA Research; Adrian Dabrowski, University of California, Irvine; Matthias
Gusenbauer, Tokyo Institute of Technology & SBA Research; Philipp Schindler, SBA Research; Edgar Weippl, University
of Vienna; Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine; Katharina Krombholz, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
SBA Research奥地利
Inexpensive Brainwave Authentication: New Techniques and Insights on User AcceptancePatricia Arias-Cabarcos, KASTEL/KIT; Thilo Habrich, Karen Becker, and Christian Becker, University of Mannheim;
Thorsten Strufe, KASTEL/KIT
KASTEL/KIT美国
Why Older Adults (Don’t) Use Password ManagersHirak Ray, Flynn Wolf, and Ravi Kuber, University of Maryland, Baltimore County; Adam J. Aviv, The George Washington UniversityUniversity of Maryland, Baltimore County美国
It’s Stored, Hopefully, on an Encrypted Server”: Mitigating Users’ Misconceptions About FIDO2 Biometric WebAuthnLeona Lassak, Ruhr University Bochum; Annika Hildebrandt, University of Chicago; Maximilian Golla, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Blase Ur, University of Chicago Ruhr University Bochum德国
Driving 2FA Adoption at Scale: Optimizing Two-Factor Authentication Notification Design PatternsMaximilian Golla, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Grant Ho, University of California San Diego;
Marika Lohmus, Cleo AI; Monica Pulluri, Facebook; Elissa M. Redmiles, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy德国
Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable EncryptionSimon Oya and Florian Kerschbaum, University of WaterlooUniversity of Waterloo加拿大
A Highly Accurate Query-Recovery Attack against Searchable Encryption using Non-Indexed DocumentsMarc Damie, University of Technology of Compiègne, France; Florian Hahn and Andreas Peter, University of Twente,
The Netherlands
University of Technology of Compiègne, France法国
Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and FragmentationMathy Vanhoef, New York University Abu DhabiNew York University Abu Dhabi阿联酋
Card Brand Mixup Attack: Bypassing the PIN in non-Visa Cards by Using Them for Visa TransactionsDavid Basin, Ralf Sasse, and Jorge Toro-Pozo, Department of Computer Science, ETH ZurichDepartment of Computer Science, ETH Zurich瑞士
Partitioning Oracle AttacksJulia Len, Paul Grubbs, and Thomas Ristenpart, Cornell TechCornell Tech美国
Raccoon Attack: Finding and Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)Robert Merget and Marcus Brinkmann, Ruhr University Bochum; Nimrod Aviram, School of Computer Science,
Tel Aviv University; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University; Johannes Mittmann, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany; Jörg Schwenk, Ruhr University Bochum
Ruhr University Bochum德国
A Side Journey To TitanThomas Roche and Victor Lomné, NinjaLab, Montpellier, France; Camille Mutschler, NinjaLab, Montpellier, France and LIRMM, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS, Montpellier, France; Laurent Imbert, LIRMM, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS, Montpellier,France NinjaLab, Montpellier, France法国
PASan: Detecting Peripheral Access Concurrency Bugs within Bare-Metal Embedded ApplicationsTaegyu Kim, Purdue University; Vireshwar Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi; Junghwan Rhee, University
of Central Oklahoma; Jizhou Chen and Kyungtae Kim, Purdue University; Chung Hwan Kim, University of Texas at
Dallas; Dongyan Xu and Dave (Jing) Tian, Purdue University
Purdue University美国
On the Design and Misuse of Microcoded (Embedded) Processors — A Cautionary NoteNils Albartus and Clemens Nasenberg, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany; Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy,
Germany; Florian Stolz, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany; Marc Fyrbiak, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy,
Germany; Christof Paar, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany; Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Germany;
Russell Tessier, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA
Ruhr University Bochum德国
M2Mon: Building an MMIO-based Security Reference Monitor for Unmanned VehiclesArslan Khan and Hyungsub Kim, Purdue University; Byoungyoung Lee, Seoul National University (SNU); Dongyan Xu,
Antonio Bianchi, and Dave (Jing) Tian, Purdue University
Purdue University美国
Sharing More and Checking Less: Leveraging Common Input Keywords to Detect Bugs in Embedded SystemsLibo Chen, School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Yanhao
Wang, QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute; Quanpu Cai and Yunfan Zhan, School of Electronic Information and
Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Hong Hu, Pennsylvania State University; Jiaqi Linghu,
QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute; Qinsheng Hou, QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute; Shandong
University; Chao Zhang and Haixin Duan, BNRist & Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University;
Tsinghua University-QI-ANXIN Group JCNS; Zhi Xue, School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University中国
Jetset: Targeted Firmware Rehosting for Embedded SystemsEvan Johnson, University of California, San Diego; Maxwell Bland, YiFei Zhu, and Joshua Mason, University of Illinois
at Urbana–Champaign; Stephen Checkoway, Oberlin College; Stefan Savage, University of California, San Diego; Kirill
Levchenko, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
 University of California, San Diego美国
LightBlue: Automatic Profile-Aware Debloating of Bluetooth StacksJianliang Wu and Ruoyu Wu, Purdue University; Daniele Antonioli and Mathias Payer, EPFL; Nils Ole Tippenhauer,
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Dongyan Xu, Dave (Jing) Tian, and Antonio Bianchi, Purdue University
Purdue University美国
PACStack: an Authenticated Call StackHans Liljestrand, University of Waterloo; Thomas Nyman and Lachlan J. Gunn, Aalto University; Jan-Erik Ekberg,
Huawei Technologies and Aalto University; N. Asokan, University of Waterloo and Aalto University
University of Waterloo加拿大
“It’s stressful having all these phones”: Investigating Sex Workers’ Safety Goals, Risks, and Practices OnlineAllison McDonald, University of Michigan; Catherine Barwulor, Clemson University; Michelle L. Mazurek, University of
Maryland; Florian Schaub, University of Michigan; Elissa M. Redmiles, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
University of Michigan美国
“Now I’m a bit angry:” Individuals’ Awareness, Perception, and Responses to Data Breaches that Affected ThemPeter Mayer, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Yixin Zou and Florian Schaub, University of Michigan; Adam J. Aviv,
The George Washington University
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology德国
“It’s the Company, the Government, You and I”: User Perceptions of Responsibility for Smart Home Privacy
and Security 
Julie Haney, National Institute of Standards and Technology; Yasemin Acar, National Institute of Standards and
Technology and Leibniz University Hannover; Susanne Furman, National Institute of Standards and Technology
National Institute of Standards and Technology美国
The Role of Computer Security Customer Support in Helping Survivors of Intimate Partner ViolenceYixin Zou and Allison McDonald, University of Michigan; Julia Narakornpichit, Nicola Dell, and Thomas Ristenpart,
Cornell Tech; Kevin Roundy, Norton Research Group; Florian Schaub, University of Michigan; Acar Tamersoy, Norton
Research Group
University of Michigan美国
Evaluating In-Workflow Messages for Improving Mental Models of End-to-End EncryptionOmer Akgul, Wei Bai, Shruti Das, and Michelle L. Mazurek, University of MarylandUniversity of Maryland美国
PriSEC: A Privacy Settings Enforcement Controller Rishabh Khandelwal and Thomas Linden, University of Wisconsin–Madison; Hamza Harkous, Google Inc.; Kassem
Fawaz, University of Wisconsin–Madison
University of Wisconsin–Madison美国
Are Privacy Dashboards Good for End Users? Evaluating User Perceptions and Reactions to Google’s My ActivityFlorian M. Farke, Ruhr University Bochum; David G. Balash, The George Washington University; Maximilian Golla,
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Markus Dürmuth, Ruhr University Bochum; Adam J. Aviv, The George
Washington University
Ruhr University Bochum德国
Mystique: Efficient Conversions for Zero-Knowledge Proofs with Applications to Machine LearningChenkai Weng, Northwestern University; Kang Yang, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology; Xiang Xie, Shanghai Key
Laboratory of Privacy-Preserving Computation and MatrixElements Technologies; Jonathan Katz, University of
Maryland; Xiao Wang, Northwestern University
Northwestern University美国
Poseidon: A New Hash Function for Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems Lorenzo Grassi, Radboud University Nijmegen; Dmitry Khovratovich, Ethereum Foundation and Dusk Network;
Christian Rechberger, IAIK, Graz University of Technology; Arnab Roy, University of Klagenfurt; Markus Schofnegger,
IAIK, Graz University of Technology
Radboud University Nijmegen荷兰
Dynamic proofs of retrievability with low server storageGaspard Anthoine, Jean-Guillaume Dumas, Mélanie de Jonghe, Aude Maignan, and Clément Pernet, Université Grenoble
Alpes; Michael Hanling and Daniel S. Roche, United States Naval Academy
Université Grenoble
Alpes
法国
Where’s Crypto?: Automated Identification and Classification of Proprietary Cryptographic Primitives in Binary CodeCarlo Meijer, Radboud University; Veelasha Moonsamy, Ruhr University Bochum; Jos Wetzels, Midnight Blue LabsRadboud University荷兰
Towards Formal Verification of State Continuity for Enclave ProgramsMohit Kumar Jangid, The Ohio State University; Guoxing Chen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Yinqian Zhang,
Southern University of Science and Technology; Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University
The Ohio State University美国
Protecting Cryptography Against Compelled Self-IncriminationSarah Scheffler and Mayank Varia, Boston UniversityBoston University美国
CSProp: Ciphertext and Signature Propagation Low-Overhead Public-Key Cryptosystem for IoT EnvironmentsFatemah Alharbi, Taibah University, Yanbu; Arwa Alrawais, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University; Abdulrahman
Bin Rabiah, University of California, Riverside, and King Saud University; Silas Richelson and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh,
University of California, Riverside
Taibah University, Yanbu沙特阿拉伯
Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transistor Jungle using Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks .Thilo Krachenfels and Tuba Kiyan, Technische Universität Berlin; Shahin Tajik, Worcester Polytechnic Institute;
Jean-Pierre Seifert, Technische Universität Berlin; Fraunhofer SIT
Technische Universität Berlin德国
Lord of the Ring(s): Side Channel Attacks on the CPU On-Chip Ring Interconnect Are Practical Riccardo Paccagnella, Licheng Luo, and Christopher W. Fletcher, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign美国
Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU FrontendIvan Puddu, Moritz Schneider, Miro Haller, and Srdjan Čapkun, ETH ZurichETH Zurich瑞士
Charger-Surfing: Exploiting a Power Line Side-Channel for Smartphone Information Leakage .Patrick Cronin, Xing Gao, and Chengmo Yang, University of Delaware; Haining Wang, Virginia TechUniversity of Delaware美国
VoltPillager: Hardware-based fault injection attacks against Intel SGX Enclaves using the SVID voltage scaling
interface
Zitai Chen, Georgios Vasilakis, Kit Murdock, Edward Dean, David Oswald, and Flavio D. Garcia, School of Computer
Science, University of Birmingham, UK
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK英国
CipherLeaks: Breaking Constant-time Cryptography on AMD SEV via the Ciphertext Side Channel Mengyuan Li, The Ohio State University; Yinqian Zhang, Southern University of Science and Technology; Huibo Wang
and Kang Li, Baidu Security; Yueqiang Cheng, NIO Security Research
The Ohio State University美国
Cross-VM and Cross-Processor Covert Channels Exploiting Processor Idle Power ManagementPaizhuo Chen, Lei Li, and Zhice Yang, ShanghaiTech UniversityShanghaiTech University中国
Can Systems Explain Permissions Better? Understanding Users’ Misperceptions under Smartphone Runtime Permission ModelBingyu Shen, University of California, San Diego; Lili Wei, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology;
Chengcheng Xiang, Yudong Wu, Mingyao Shen, and Yuanyuan Zhou, University of California, San Diego; Xinxin Jin,
Whova, Inc.
University of California, San Diego美国
“Shhh. be quiet!” Reducing the Unwanted Interruptions of Notification Permission Prompts on ChromeIgor Bilogrevic, Balazs Engedy, Judson L. Porter III, Nina Taft, Kamila Hasanbega, Andrew Paseltiner, Hwi Kyoung Lee,
Edward Jung, Meggyn Watkins, PJ McLachlan, and Jason James, Google
Google美国
Explanation Beats Context: The Effect of Timing & Rationales on Users’ Runtime Permission DecisionsYusra Elbitar, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland University; Michael Schilling, CISPA
Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Trung Tin Nguyen, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security,
Saarland University; Michael Backes and Sven Bugiel, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland University德国
A Large Scale Study of User Behavior, Expectations and Engagement with Android PermissionsWeicheng Cao and Chunqiu Xia, University of Toronto; Sai Teja Peddinti, Google; David Lie, University of Toronto;
Nina Taft, Google; Lisa M. Austin, University of Toronto
University of Toronto加拿大
Reducing Bias in Modeling Real-world Password Strength via Deep Learning and Dynamic DictionariesDario Pasquini, Sapienza University of Rome, Institute of Applied Computing CNR; Marco Cianfriglia, Institute of
Applied Computing CNR; Giuseppe Ateniese, Stevens Institute of Technology; Massimo Bernaschi, Institute of
Applied Computing CNR
Sapienza University of Rome, Institute of Applied Computing CNR意大利
Using Amnesia to Detect Credential Database BreachesKe Coby Wang, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Michael K. Reiter, Duke UniversityUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill美国
Incrementally Updateable Honey Password Vaults Haibo Cheng, Wenting Li, and Ping Wang, Peking University; Chao-Hsien Chu, Pennsylvania State University; Kaitai
Liang, Delft University of Technology
 Peking University中国
Private Blocklist Lookups with ChecklistDmitry Kogan, Stanford University; Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, MIT CSAILStanford University美国
Identifying Harmful Media in End-to-End Encrypted Communication: Efficient Private Membership
Computation
Anunay Kulshrestha and Jonathan Mayer, Princeton UniversityPrinceton University美国
Fuzzy Labeled Private Set Intersection with Applications to Private Real-Time Biometric SearchErkam Uzun, Simon P. Chung, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Wenke Lee, Georgia Institute of TechnologyGeorgia Institute of Technology美国
PrivSyn: Differentially Private Data SynthesisZhikun Zhang, Zhejiang University and CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Tianhao Wang, Ninghui Li,
and Jean Honorio, Purdue University; Michael Backes, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Shibo He and
Jiming Chen, Zhejiang University and Alibaba-Zhejiang University Joint Research Institute of Frontier Technologies;
Yang Zhang, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Zhejiang University and CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security中国
Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy ProtocolsXiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke UniversityDuke University美国
How to Make Private Distributed Cardinality Estimation Practical, and Get Differential Privacy for FreeChanghui Hu, Newcastle University; Jin Li, Guangzhou University; Zheli Liu, Xiaojie Guo, Yu Wei, and Xuan Guang,
Nankai University; Grigorios Loukides, King’s College London; Changyu Dong, Newcastle University
 Newcastle University英国
Locally Differentially Private Analysis of Graph StatisticsJacob Imola, UC San Diego; Takao Murakami, AIST; Kamalika Chaudhuri, UC San Diego UC San Diego美国
SMASH: Synchronized Many-sided Rowhammer Attacks from JavaScriptFinn de Ridder, ETH Zurich and VU Amsterdam; Pietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida,
VU Amsterdam; Kaveh Razavi, ETH Zurich
ETH Zurich and VU Amsterdam瑞士&荷兰
Database Reconstruction from Noisy Volumes: A Cache Side-Channel Attack on SQLiteAria Shahverdi, University of Maryland; Mahammad Shirinov, Bilkent University; Dana Dachman-Soled, University of
Maryland
University of Maryland美国
PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to AuthenticationReza Mirzazade Farkhani, Mansour Ahmadi, and Long Lu, Northeastern UniversityNortheastern University美国
Does logic locking work with EDA tools?Zhaokun Han, Muhammad Yasin, and Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran, Texas A&M UniversityTexas A&M University美国
Cure: A Security Architecture with CUstomizable and Resilient EnclavesRaad Bahmani, Ferdinand Brasser, Ghada Dessouky, Patrick Jauernig, Matthias Klimmek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Emmanuel Stapf, Technische Universität DarmstadtTechnische Universität Darmstadt德国
DICE*: A Formally Verified Implementation of DICE Measured BootZhe Tao, University of California, Davis; Aseem Rastogi, Naman Gupta, and Kapil Vaswani, Microsoft Research;
Aditya V. Thakur, University of California, Davis
University of California, Davis美国
PEARL: Plausibly Deniable Flash Translation Layer using WOM codingChen Chen, Anrin Chakraborti, and Radu Sion, Stony Brook University
Usable Security and Privacy: Institutional Perspectives
Stony Brook University
Usable Security and Privacy: Institutional Perspectives
美国
Examining the Efficacy of Decoy-based and Psychological Cyber DeceptionKimberly J. Ferguson-Walter, Laboratory for Advanced Cybersecurity Research; Maxine M. Major, Naval Information
Warfare Center, Pacific; Chelsea K. Johnson, Arizona State University; Daniel H. Muhleman, Naval Information Warfare
Center, Pacific
 Laboratory for Advanced Cybersecurity Research美国
Helping Users Automatically Find and Manage Sensitive, Expendable Files in Cloud StorageMohammad Taha Khan, University of Illinois at Chicago / Washington & Lee University; Christopher Tran and Shubham
Singh, University of Illinois at Chicago; Dimitri Vasilkov, University of Chicago; Chris Kanich, University of Illinois at
Chicago; Blase Ur, University of Chicago; Elena Zheleva, University of Illinois at Chicago
University of Illinois at Chicago / Washington & Lee University美国
Adapting Security Warnings to Counter Online DisinformationBen Kaiser, Jerry Wei, Eli Lucherini, and Kevin Lee, Princeton University; J. Nathan Matias, Cornell University;
Jonathan Mayer, Princeton University
Princeton University美国
“Why wouldn’t someone think of democracy as a target?”: Security practices & challenges of people involved with
U.S. political campaigns
Sunny Consolvo, Patrick Gage Kelley, Tara Matthews, Kurt Thomas, Lee Dunn, and Elie Bursztein, GoogleGoogle美国
Security Obstacles and Motivations for Small Businesses from a CISO’s PerspectiveFlynn Wolf, University of Maryland, Baltimore County; Adam J. Aviv, The George Washington University; Ravi Kuber,
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
University of Maryland美国
Strategies and Perceived Risks of Sending Sensitive Documents Noel Warford, University of Maryland; Collins W. Munyendo, The George Washington University; Ashna Mediratta,
University of Maryland; Adam J. Aviv, The George Washington University; Michelle L. Mazurek, University of Maryland
University of Maryland美国
A Large-Scale Interview Study on Information Security in and Attacks against Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises
Nicolas Huaman, Leibniz University Hannover; CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Bennet von
Skarczinski, PwC Germany; Christian Stransky and Dominik Wermke, Leibniz University Hannover; Yasemin Acar,
Leibniz University Hannover; Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Arne Dreißigacker, Criminological Research
Institute of Lower Saxony; Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover; CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Leibniz University Hannover德国
On the Routing-Aware Peering against Network-Eclipse Attacks in BitcoinMuoi Tran and Akshaye Shenoi, National University of Singapore; Min Suk Kang, KAISTNational University of Singapore新加坡

EOSafe: Security Analysis of EOSIO Smart Contracts
Ningyu He, Key Lab on HCST (MOE), Peking University; Ruiyi Zhang, PeckShield, Inc.; Haoyu Wang, Beijing University
of Posts and Telecommunications; Lei Wu, Zhejiang University; Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University;
Yao Guo, Key Lab on HCST (MOE), Peking University; Ting Yu, Qatar Computing Research Institute; Xuxian Jiang,
PeckShield, Inc.
 Peking University中国
EVMPatch: Timely and Automated Patching of Ethereum Smart ContractsMichael Rodler, University of Duisburg-Essen; Wenting Li and Ghassan O. Karame, NEC Laboratories Europe;
Lucas Davi, University of Duisburg-Essen
University of Duisburg-Essen德国
Evil Under the Sun: Understanding and Discovering Attacks on Ethereum Decentralized Applications Liya Su, Indiana University Bloomington; Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University
of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Xinyue Shen, Indiana University Bloomington and Alibaba Group; Xiangyu Du,
Indiana University Bloomington; Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of
Chinese Academy of Sciences; Xiaojing Liao, XiaoFeng Wang, and Luyi Xing, Indiana University Bloomington; Baoxu
Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Indiana University Bloomington印度
Smart Contract Vulnerabilities: Vulnerable Does Not Imply ExploitedDaniel Perez and Benjamin Livshits, Imperial College LondonImperial College London英国
Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum
Blockchain
Christof Ferreira Torres, SnT, University of Luxembourg; Ramiro Camino, Luxembourg Institute of Science and
Technology; Radu State, SnT, University of Luxembourg
University of Luxembourg卢森堡
SmarTest: Effectively Hunting Vulnerable Transaction Sequences in Smart Contracts through Language
Model-Guided Symbolic Execution
Sunbeom So, Seongjoon Hong, and Hakjoo Oh, Korea UniversityKorea University韩国
MIRAGE: Mitigating Conflict-Based Cache Attacks with a Practical Fully-Associative DesignGururaj Saileshwar and Moinuddin Qureshi, Georgia Institute of TechnologyGeorgia Institute of Technology美国
Dolma: Securing Speculation with the Principle of Transient Non-ObservabilityKevin Loughlin, Ian Neal, Jiacheng Ma, Elisa Tsai, Ofir Weisse, Satish Narayanasamy, and Baris Kasikci, University of
Michigan
University of Michigan美国
Osiris: Automated Discovery of Microarchitectural Side ChannelsDaniel Weber, Ahmad Ibrahim, Hamed Nemati, Michael Schwarz, and Christian Rossow, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information SecurityCISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
Swivel: Hardening WebAssembly against Spectre Shravan Narayan and Craig Disselkoen, UC San Diego; Daniel Moghimi, Worcester Polytechnic Institute and UC San
Diego; Sunjay Cauligi, Evan Johnson, and Zhao Gang, UC San Diego; Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Intel Labs; Ravi
Sahita, Intel; Hovav Shacham, UT Austin; Dean Tullsen and Deian Stefan, UC San Diego
UC San Diego美国
Rage Against the Machine Clear: A Systematic Analysis of Machine Clears and Their Implications for
Transient Execution Attacks
Hany Ragab, Enrico Barberis, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamVrije Universiteit Amsterdam荷兰
Coco: Co-Design and Co-Verification of Masked Software Implementations on CPUsBarbara Gigerl, Vedad Hadzic, and Robert Primas, Graz University of Technology; Stefan Mangard, Graz University of
Technology, Lamarr Security Research; Roderick Bloem, Graz University of Technology
Graz University of Technology奥地利
Explanation-Guided Backdoor Poisoning Attacks Against Malware ClassifiersGiorgio Severi, Northeastern University; Jim Meyer, Xailient Inc.; Scott Coull, FireEye Inc.; Alina Oprea, Northeastern
University
Northeastern University美国
Blind Backdoors in Deep Learning ModelsEugene Bagdasaryan and Vitaly Shmatikov, Cornell TechCornell Tech美国
Graph BackdoorZhaohan Xi and Ren Pang, Pennsylvania State University; Shouling Ji, Zhejiang University; Ting Wang, Pennsylvania
State University
Pennsylvania State University美国
Demon in the Variant: Statistical Analysis of DNNs for Robust Backdoor Contamination Detection Di Tang, Chinese University of Hong Kong; XiaoFeng Wang and Haixu Tang, Indiana University; Kehuan Zhang,
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Chinese University of Hong Kong中国
You Autocomplete Me: Poisoning Vulnerabilities in Neural Code CompletionRoei Schuster, Tel-Aviv University, Cornell Tech; Congzheng Song, Cornell University; Eran Tromer, Tel Aviv University;
Vitaly Shmatikov, Cornell Tech
Tel-Aviv University, Cornell Tech美国
Poisoning the Unlabeled Dataset of Semi-Supervised LearningNicholas Carlini, GoogleGoogle美国
Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning SystemsJose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Gang Wang, and Christopher W. Fletcher, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign美国
Fine Grained Dataflow Tracking with Proximal GradientsGabriel Ryan, Abhishek Shah, and Dongdong She, Columbia University; Koustubha Bhat, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam;
Suman Jana, Columbia University
 Columbia University美国
Static Detection of Unsafe DMA Accesses in Device Drivers Jia-Ju Bai and Tuo Li, Tsinghua University; Kangjie Lu, University of Minnesota; Shi-Min Hu, Tsinghua UniversityTsinghua University中国
Maze: Towards Automated Heap Feng ShuiYan Wang, {CAS-KLONAT, BKLONSPT}, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; WeiRan
Lab, Huawei Technologies; Chao Zhang, BNRist & Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University;
Tsinghua University-QI-ANXIN Group JCNS; Zixuan Zhao, Bolun Zhang, Xiaorui Gong, and Wei Zou, {CAS-KLONAT,
BKLONSPT,} Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences中国
SelectiveTaint: Efficient Data Flow Tracking With Static Binary RewritingSanchuan Chen, Zhiqiang Lin, and Yinqian Zhang, The Ohio State UniversityThe Ohio State University美国
Breaking Through Binaries: Compiler-quality Instrumentation for Better Binary-only Fuzzing Stefan Nagy, Virginia Tech; Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Jason D. Hiser, and Jack W. Davidson, University of Virginia;
Matthew Hicks, Virginia Tech
Virginia Tech美国
MBA-Blast: Unveiling and Simplifying Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic ObfuscationBinbin Liu, University of Science and Technology of China & University of New Hampshire; Junfu Shen, University
of New Hampshire; Jiang Ming, University of Texas at Arlington; Qilong Zheng and Jing Li, University of Science and
Technology of China; Dongpeng Xu, University of New Hampshire
University of Science and Technology of China & University of New Hampshire中国
VScape: Assessing and Escaping Virtual Call ProtectionsKaixiang Chen, Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University; Chao Zhang, Institute for Network
Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University/Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology/
Tsinghua University-QI-ANXIN Group JCNS; Tingting Yin and Xingman Chen, Institute for Network Science and
Cyberspace, Tsinghua University; Lei Zhao, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University
Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University中国
Pretty Good Phone PrivacyPaul Schmitt, Princeton University; Barath Raghavan, University of Southern CaliforniaPrinceton University美国
KeyForge: Non-Attributable Email from Forward-Forgeable SignaturesMichael A. Specter, MIT; Sunoo Park, MIT & Harvard; Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins UniversityMIT美国
Express: Lowering the Cost of Metadata-hiding Communication with Cryptographic PrivacySaba Eskandarian, Stanford University; Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, MIT CSAIL; Matei Zaharia and Dan Boneh,
Stanford University
Stanford University美国
Kalεido: Real-Time Privacy Control for Eye-Tracking SystemsJingjie Li, Amrita Roy Chowdhury, Kassem Fawaz, and Younghyun Kim, University of Wisconsin–MadisonUniversity of Wisconsin–Madison美国
Communication–Computation Trade-offs in PIRAsra Ali, Google; Tancrède Lepoint; Sarvar Patel, Mariana Raykova, Phillipp Schoppmann, Karn Seth, and Kevin Yeo,GoogleGoogle美国
I Always Feel Like Somebody’s Sensing Me! A Framework to Detect, Identify, and Localize Clandestine Wireless Sensors Akash Deep Singh, University of California, Los Angeles; Luis Garcia, University of California, Los Angeles, and
USC ISI; Joseph Noor and Mani Srivastava, University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Los Angeles美国
The Complexities of Healing in Secure Group Messaging: Why Cross-Group Effects MatterCas Cremers, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Britta Hale, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS);
Konrad Kohbrok, Aalto University
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
SLAP: Improving Physical Adversarial Examples with Short-Lived Adversarial Perturbations Giulio Lovisotto, Henry Turner, and Ivo Sluganovic, University of Oxford; Martin Strohmeier, armasuisse; Ivan Martinovic,
University of Oxford
University of Oxford英国
Adversarial Policy Training against Deep Reinforcement LearningXian Wu, Wenbo Guo, Hua Wei, and Xinyu Xing, The Pennsylvania State UniversityThe Pennsylvania State University美国
DrMi: A Dataset Reduction Technology based on Mutual Information for Black-box AttacksYingzhe He, Guozhu Meng, Kai Chen, Xingbo Hu, and Jinwen He, SKLOIS, Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences/School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences/School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
中国
Deep-Dup: An Adversarial Weight Duplication Attack Framework to Crush Deep Neural Network in
Multi-Tenant FPGA
Adnan Siraj Rakin, Arizona State University; Yukui Luo and Xiaolin Xu, Northeastern University; Deliang Fan,
Arizona State University
Arizona State University美国
Entangled Watermarks as a Defense against Model Extraction Hengrui Jia and Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, University of Toronto and Vector Institute; Varun Chandrasekaran,
University of Wisconsin-Madison; Nicolas Papernot, University of Toronto and Vector Institute
 University of Toronto and Vector Institute加拿大
Mind Your Weight(s): A Large-scale Study on Insufficient Machine Learning Model Protection in Mobile AppsZhichuang Sun, Ruimin Sun, Long Lu, and Alan Mislove, Northeastern UniversityNortheastern University美国
Hermes Attack: Steal DNN Models with Lossless Inference Accuracy Yuankun Zhu, The University of Texas at Dallas; Yueqiang Cheng, Baidu Security; Husheng Zhou, VMware; Yantao Lu,
Syracuse University
The University of Texas at Dallas美国
ARCUS: Symbolic Root Cause Analysis of Exploits in Production SystemsCarter Yagemann, Georgia Institute of Technology; Matthew Pruett, Georgia Tech Research Institute; Simon P. Chung,
Georgia Institute of Technology; Kennon Bittick, Georgia Tech Research Institute; Brendan Saltaformaggio and Wenke
Lee, Georgia Institute of Technology
Georgia Institute of Technology美国
Automatic Firmware Emulation through Invalidity-guided Knowledge InferenceWei Zhou, National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences;
Le Guan, Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia; Peng Liu, College of Information Sciences and
Technology, The Pennsylvania State University; Yuqing Zhang, National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center,
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; School of Computer Science
and Cyberspace Security, Hainan University
National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences中国
Finding Bugs Using Your Own Code: Detecting Functionally-similar yet Inconsistent CodeMansour Ahmadi, Reza Mirzazade Farkhani, Ryan Williams, and Long Lu, Northeastern UniversityNortheastern University美国
Understanding and Detecting Disordered Error Handling with Precise Function PairingQiushi Wu, Aditya Pakki, Navid Emamdoost, Stephen McCamant, and Kangjie Lu, University of MinnesotaUniversity of Minnesota美国
Precise and Scalable Detection of Use-after-Compacting-Garbage-Collection BugsHyungSeok Han, Andrew Wesie, and Brian Pak, Theori Inc.Theori Inc.美国
Reducing Test Cases with Attention Mechanism of Neural NetworksXing Zhang, Jiongyi Chen, Chao Feng, Ruilin Li, Yunfei Su, Bin Zhang, Jing Lei, and Chaojing Tang, National University
of Defense Technology
National University
of Defense Technology
中国
FlowDist: Multi-Staged Refinement-Based Dynamic Information Flow Analysis for Distributed Software
Systems
Xiaoqin Fu and Haipeng Cai, Washington State University, Pullman, WA Washington State University, Pullman, WA
Secure Multiparty Computation
美国
Privacy and Integrity Preserving Computations with CRISP Sylvain Chatel, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, EPFLEPFL瑞士
Senate: A Maliciously-Secure MPC Platform for Collaborative AnalyticsRishabh Poddar and Sukrit Kalra, UC Berkeley; Avishay Yanai, VMware Research; Ryan Deng, Raluca Ada Popa, and
Joseph M. Hellerstein, UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley美国
GForce: GPU-Friendly Oblivious and Rapid Neural Network Inference Lucien K. L. Ng and Sherman S. M. Chow, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong KongThe Chinese University of Hong Kong中国
ABY2.0: Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party ComputationArpita Patra, Indian Institute of Science; Thomas Schneider, TU Darmstadt; Ajith Suresh, Indian Institute of Science;
Hossein Yalame, TU Darmstadt
Indian Institute of Science印度
Fantastic Four: Honest-Majority Four-Party Secure Computation With Malicious SecurityAnders Dalskov, Aarhus University & Partisia; Daniel Escudero, Aarhus University; Marcel Keller, CSIRO’s Data61Aarhus University & Partisia丹麦
Muse: Secure Inference Resilient to Malicious Clients Ryan Lehmkuhl and Pratyush Mishra, UC Berkeley; Akshayaram Srinivasan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research;
Raluca Ada Popa, UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley美国
ObliCheck: Efficient Verification of Oblivious Algorithms with Unobservable StateJeongseok Son, Griffin Prechter, Rishabh Poddar, Raluca Ada Popa, and Koushik Sen, University of California, BerkeleyUniversity of California美国
PatchGuard: A Provably Robust Defense against Adversarial Patches via Small Receptive Fields and MaskingChong Xiang, Princeton University; Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, University of Chicago; Vikash Sehwag and Prateek Mittal,
Princeton University
Princeton University美国
T-Miner: A Generative Approach to Defend Against Trojan Attacks on DNN-based Text ClassificationAhmadreza Azizi and Ibrahim Asadullah Tahmid, Virginia Tech; Asim Waheed, LUMS Pakistan; Neal Mangaokar,
University of Michigan; Jiameng Pu, Virginia Tech; Mobin Javed, LUMS Pakistan; Chandan K. Reddy and Bimal
Viswanath, Virginia Tech
Virginia Tech美国
WaveGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Audio Adversarial ExamplesShehzeen Hussain, Paarth Neekhara, Shlomo Dubnov, Julian McAuley, and Farinaz Koushanfar, University of California,
San Diego
 University of California,
San Diego
美国
Cost-Aware Robust Tree Ensembles for Security ApplicationsYizheng Chen, Shiqi Wang, Weifan Jiang, Asaf Cidon, and Suman Jana, Columbia UniversityYizheng Chen, Shiqi Wang, Weifan Jiang, Asaf Cidon, and Suman Jana, Columbia University美国
Dompteur: Taming Audio Adversarial ExamplesThorsten Eisenhofer, Lea Schönherr, and Joel Frank, Ruhr University Bochum; Lars Speckemeier, University College
London; Dorothea Kolossa and Thorsten Holz, Ruhr University Bochum
Ruhr University Bochum德国
CADE: Detecting and Explaining Concept Drift Samples for Security ApplicationsLimin Yang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Wenbo Guo, The Pennsylvania State University; Qingying
Hao, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Arridhana Ciptadi and Ali Ahmadzadeh, Blue Hexagon; Xinyu Xing,
The Pennsylvania State University; Gang Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign美国
Sigl: Securing Software Installations Through Deep Graph LearningXueyuan Han, Harvard University; Xiao Yu, NEC Laboratories America; Thomas Pasquier, University of Bristol; Ding
Li, Peking University; Junghwan Rhee, NEC Laboratories America; James Mickens, Harvard University; Margo Seltzer,
University of British Columbia; Haifeng Chen, NEC Laboratories America
Harvard University美国
ExpRace: Exploiting Kernel Races through Raising InterruptsYoochan Lee, Seoul National University; Changwoo Min, Virginia Tech; Byoungyoung Lee, Seoul National UniversitySeoul National University韩国
Undo Workarounds for Kernel BugsSeyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Zhihao Yao, and Ardalan Amiri Sani, UC Irvine; Zhiyun Qian, UC Riverside;
Daniel Austin, Atlassian
UC Irvine美国
An Analysis of Speculative Type Confusion Vulnerabilities in the WildOfek Kirzner and Adam Morrison, Tel Aviv UniversityTel Aviv University以色列
Blinder: Partition-Oblivious Hierarchical SchedulingMan-Ki Yoon, Mengqi Liu, Hao Chen, Jung-Eun Kim, and Zhong Shao, Yale UniversityYale University美国
Shard: Fine-Grained Kernel Specialization with Context-Aware HardeningMuhammad Abubakar, Adil Ahmad, Pedro Fonseca, and Dongyan Xu, Purdue UniversityPurdue University美国
Preventing Use-After-Free Attacks with Fast Forward AllocationBrian Wickman, GTRI; Hong Hu, PennState; Insu Yun, Daehee Jang, and JungWon Lim, GeorgiaTech; Sanidhya Kashyap,
EPFL; Taesoo Kim, GeorgiaTech
GTRI美国
Detecting Kernel Refcount Bugs with Two-Dimensional Consistency CheckingXin Tan, Yuan Zhang, and Xiyu Yang, Fudan University; Kangjie Lu, University of Minnesota; Min Yang, Fudan University Fudan University中国
Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support Max Maass and Alina Stöver, TU Darmstadt; Henning Pridöhl, Universität Bamberg; Sebastian Bretthauer, GoetheUniversität Frankfurt; Dominik Herrmann, Universität Bamberg; Matthias Hollick, TU Darmstadt; Indra Spiecker,
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
TU Darmstadt德国
Fingerprinting in Style: Detecting Browser Extensions via Injected Style Sheets Pierre Laperdrix, Univ. Lille, CNRS, Inria; Oleksii Starov, Palo Alto Networks; Quan Chen and Alexandros Kapravelos,
North Carolina State University; Nick Nikiforakis, Stony Brook University
CNRS, Inria印度
JAW: Studying Client-side CSRF with Hybrid Property Graphs and Declarative TraversalsSoheil Khodayari and Giancarlo Pellegrino, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information SecurityCISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
AdCube: WebVR Ad Fraud and Practical Confinement of Third-Party AdsHyunjoo Lee, Jiyeon Lee, and Daejun Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology; Suman Jana,
Columbia University; Insik Shin and Sooel Son, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology韩国
CACTI: Captcha Avoidance via Client-side TEE IntegrationYoshimichi Nakatsuka and Ercan Ozturk, University of California, Irvine; Andrew Paverd, Microsoft Research;
Gene Tsudik, University of California, Irvine
University of California, Irvine美国
PolyScope: Multi-Policy Access Control Analysis to Compute Authorized Attack Operations in Android SystemsYu-Tsung Lee, Penn State University; William Enck, North Carolina State University; Haining Chen, Google;
Hayawardh Vijayakumar, Samsung Research; Ninghui Li, Purdue University; Zhiyun Qian and Daimeng Wang,
UC Riverside; Giuseppe Petracca, Lyft; Trent Jaeger, Penn State University
Penn State University美国
Nyx: Greybox Hypervisor Fuzzing using Fast Snapshots and Affine TypesSergej Schumilo, Cornelius Aschermann, Ali Abbasi, Simon Wörner, and Thorsten Holz, Ruhr-Universität BochumRuhr-Universität Bochum德国
Systematic Evaluation of Privacy Risks of Machine Learning ModelsLiwei Song and Prateek Mittal, Princeton University Princeton University美国
Extracting Training Data from Large Language ModelsNicholas Carlini, Google; Florian Tramèr, Stanford University; Eric Wallace, UC Berkeley; Matthew Jagielski,
Northeastern University; Ariel Herbert-Voss, OpenAI and Harvard University; Katherine Lee and Adam Roberts,
Google; Tom Brown, OpenAI; Dawn Song, UC Berkeley; Úlfar Erlingsson, Apple; Alina Oprea, Northeastern University;
Colin Raffel, Google
Google美国
SWIFT: Super-fast and Robust Privacy-Preserving Machine LearningNishat Koti, Mahak Pancholi, Arpita Patra, and Ajith Suresh, Indian Institute of Science, BangaloreIndian Institute of Science, Bangalore印度
Stealing Links from Graph Neural NetworksXinlei He, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Jinyuan Jia, Duke University; Michael Backes, CISPA
Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University; Yang Zhang, CISPA Helmholtz
Center for Information Security
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
Leakage of Dataset Properties in Multi-Party Machine LearningWanrong Zhang, Georgia Institute of Technology; Shruti Tople, Microsoft Research; Olga Ohrimenko, The University of
Melbourne
Georgia Institute of Technology美国
Defeating DNN-Based Traffic Analysis Systems in Real-Time With Blind Adversarial Perturbations Milad Nasr, Alireza Bahramali, and Amir Houmansadr, University of Massachusetts AmherstUniversity of Massachusetts Amherst美国
Cerebro: A Platform for Multi-Party Cryptographic Collaborative LearningWenting Zheng, UC Berkeley/CMU; Ryan Deng, Weikeng Chen, and Raluca Ada Popa, UC Berkeley; Aurojit Panda,
New York University; Ion Stoica, UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley/CMU美国
SyzVegas: Beating Kernel Fuzzing Odds with Reinforcement LearningDaimeng Wang, Zheng Zhang, Hang Zhang, Zhiyun Qian, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh,
University of California, Riverside
University of California, Riverside美国
Android SmartTVs Vulnerability Discovery via Log-Guided FuzzingYousra Aafer, University of Waterloo; Wei You, Renmin University of China; Yi Sun, Yu Shi, and Xiangyu Zhang,
Purdue University; Heng Yin, UC Riverside
University of Waterloo加拿大
UniFuzz: A Holistic and Pragmatic Metrics-Driven Platform for Evaluating Fuzzers Yuwei Li, Zhejiang University; Shouling Ji, Zhejiang University/Zhejiang University NGICS Platform; Yuan Chen,
Zhejiang University; Sizhuang Liang, Georgia Institute of Technology; Wei-Han Lee, IBM Research; Yueyao Chen
and Chenyang Lyu, Zhejiang University; Chunming Wu, Zhejiang University/Zhejiang Lab, Hangzhou, China;
Raheem Beyah, Georgia Institute of Technology; Peng Cheng, Zhejiang University NGICS Platform/Zhejiang University;
Kangjie Lu, University of Minnesota; Ting Wang, Pennsylvania State University
Zhejiang University中国
Token-Level FuzzingChristopher Salls, UC Santa Barbara; Chani Jindal, Microsoft; Jake Corina, Seaside Security; Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna, UC Santa BarbaraUC Santa Barbara美国
APICraft: Fuzz Driver Generation for Closed-source SDK Libraries Cen Zhang, Nanyang Technological University; Xingwei Lin, Ant Group; Yuekang Li, Nanyang Technological University;
Yinxing Xue, University of Science and Technology of China; Jundong Xie, Ant Group; Hongxu Chen, Nanyang
Technological University; Xinlei Ying and Jiashui Wang, Ant Group; Yang Liu, Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University新加坡
The Use of Likely Invariants as Feedback for FuzzersAndrea Fioraldi, EURECOM; Daniele Cono D’Elia, Sapienza University of Rome; Davide Balzarotti, EURECOMEURECOM法国
ICSFuzz: Manipulating I/Os and Repurposing Binary Code to Enable Instrumented Fuzzing in ICS Control ApplicationsDimitrios Tychalas, NYU Tandon School of Engineering; Hadjer Benkraouda and Michail Maniatakos, New York University
Abu Dhabi
NYU Tandon School of Engineering美国
Prime+Probe 1, JavaScript 0: Overcoming Browser-based Side-Channel DefensesAnatoly Shusterman, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Ayush Agarwal, University of Michigan; Sioli O’Connell,
University of Adelaide; Daniel Genkin, University of Michigan; Yossi Oren, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev;
Yuval Yarom, University of Adelaide and Data61
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev以色列
Saphire: Sandboxing PHP Applications with Tailored System Call AllowlistsAlexander Bulekov, Rasoul Jahanshahi, and Manuel Egele, Boston UniversityBoston University美国
SandTrap: Securing JavaScript-driven Trigger-Action PlatformsMohammad M. Ahmadpanah, Chalmers University of Technology; Daniel Hedin, Chalmers University of Technology
and Mälardalen University; Musard Balliu, KTH Royal Institute of Technology; Lars Eric Olsson and Andrei Sabelfeld,
Chalmers University of Technology
Chalmers University of Technology瑞典
Can I Take Your Subdomain? Exploring Same-Site Attacks in the Modern WebMarco Squarcina, Mauro Tempesta, and Lorenzo Veronese, TU Wien; Stefano Calzavara, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia & OWASP; Matteo Maffei, TU WienTU Wien奥地利
U Can’t Debug This: Detecting JavaScript Anti-Debugging Techniques in the WildMarius Musch and Martin Johns, TU BraunschweigTU Braunschweig德国
Abusing Hidden Properties to Attack the Node.js EcosystemFeng Xiao, Georgia Tech; Jianwei Huang, Texas A&M University; Yichang Xiong, Independent Researcher; Guangliang
Yang, Georgia Tech; Hong Hu, Penn State University; Guofei Gu, Texas A&M University; Wenke Lee, Georgia Tech
 Georgia Tech美国
mID: Tracing Screen Photos via Moiré PatternsYushi Cheng, Xiaoyu Ji, Lixu Wang, and Qi Pang, Zhejiang University; Yi-Chao Chen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University;
Wenyuan Xu, Zhejiang University
Zhejiang University中国
SEAL: Storage-efficient Causality Analysis on Enterprise Logs with Query-friendly Compression Peng Fei, Zhou Li, and Zhiying Wang, University of California, Irvine; Xiao Yu, NEC Laboratories America, Inc.;
Ding Li, Peking University; Kangkook Jee, University of Texas at Dallas
University of California, Irvine美国
ATLAS: A Sequence-based Learning Approach for Attack InvestigationAbdulellah Alsaheel and Yuhong Nan, Purdue University; Shiqing Ma, Rutgers University; Le Yu, Gregory Walkup,
Z. Berkay Celik, Xiangyu Zhang, and Dongyan Xu, Purdue University
Purdue University美国
Elise: A Storage Efficient Logging System Powered by Redundancy Reduction and Representation LearningHailun Ding, Shenao Yan, Juan Zhai, and Shiqing Ma, Rutgers UniversityRutgers University美国
V0Finder: Discovering the Correct Origin of Publicly Reported Software VulnerabilitiesSeunghoon Woo, Dongwook Lee, Sunghan Park, and Heejo Lee, Korea University; Sven Dietrich, City University of New YorkKorea University韩国
Minerva– An Efficient Risk-Limiting Ballot Polling AuditFilip Zagórski, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology; Grant McClearn and Sarah Morin, The George Washington University; Neal McBurnett; Poorvi L. Vora, The George Washington UniversityWroclaw University of Science and Technology波兰
Security Analysis of the Democracy Live Online Voting System Michael Specter, MIT; J. Alex Halderman, University of MichiganMIT美国
Hopper: Modeling and Detecting Lateral MovementGrant Ho, UC San Diego, UC Berkeley, and Dropbox; Mayank Dhiman, Dropbox; Devdatta Akhawe, Figma, Inc.;
Vern Paxson, UC Berkeley and International Computer Science Institute; Stefan Savage and Geoffrey M. Voelker,
UC San Diego; David Wagner, UC Berkeley
UC San Diego, UC Berkeley, and Dropbox美国
LZR: Identifying Unexpected Internet ServicesLiz Izhikevich, Stanford University; Renata Teixeira, Inria; Zakir Durumeric, Stanford UniversityStanford University美国
Blind In/On-Path Attacks and Applications to VPNsWilliam J. Tolley and Beau Kujath, Breakpointing Bad/Arizona State University; Mohammad Taha Khan, Washington and
Lee University; Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, IMDEA Networks Institute/ICSI; Jedidiah R. Crandall, Breakpointing Bad/
Arizona State University
Breakpointing Bad/Arizona State University美国
The Hijackers Guide To The Galaxy: Off-Path Taking Over Internet ResourcesTianxiang Dai, Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT; Philipp Jeitner, Fraunhofer Institute for
Secure Information Technology SIT, Technical University of Darmstadt; Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer Institute for
Secure Information Technology SIT; Michael Waidner, Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT,
Technical University of Darmstadt
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT德国
Injection Attacks Reloaded: Tunnelling Malicious Payloads over DNSPhilipp Jeitner, TU Darmstadt; Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SITFraunhofer SIT德国
Causal Analysis for Software-Defined Networking AttacksBenjamin E. Ujcich, Georgetown University; Samuel Jero and Richard Skowyra, MIT Lincoln Laboratory; Adam Bates,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; William H. Sanders, Carnegie Mellon University; Hamed Okhravi,
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Georgetown University美国
Weak Links in Authentication Chains: A Large-scale Analysis of Email Sender Spoofing AttacksKaiwen Shen, Chuhan Wang, and Minglei Guo, Tsinghua University; Xiaofeng Zheng, Tsinghua University and Qi An
Xin Technology Research Institute; Chaoyi Lu and Baojun Liu, Tsinghua University; Yuxuan Zhao, North China Institute
of Computing Technology; Shuang Hao, University of Texas at Dallas; Haixin Duan, Tsinghua University; Qi An Xin
Technology Research Institute; Qingfeng Pan, Coremail Technology Co. Ltd; Min Yang, Fudan University
Tsinghua University中国
Automated Discovery of Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Connected Vehicle ProtocolsShengtuo Hu, University of Michigan; Qi Alfred Chen, UC Irvine; Jiachen Sun, Yiheng Feng, Z. Morley Mao, and
Henry X. Liu, University of Michigan
University of Michigan美国
Too Good to Be Safe: Tricking Lane Detection in Autonomous Driving with Crafted PerturbationsPengfei Jing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Keen Security Lab, Tencent; Qiyi Tang and Yuefeng Du,
Keen Security Lab, Tencent; Lei Xue and Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Ting Wang,
Pennsylvania State University; Sen Nie and Shi Wu, Keen Security Lab, Tencent
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Keen Security Lab, Tencent中国
Acoustics to the Rescue: Physical Key Inference Attack RevisitedSoundarya Ramesh and Rui Xiao, National University of Singapore; Anindya Maiti, University of Oklahoma; Jong Taek
Lee, Harini Ramprasad, and Ananda Kumar, National University of Singapore; Murtuza Jadliwala, University of Texas at
San Antonio; Jun Han, National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore新加坡
Messy States of Wiring: Vulnerabilities in Emerging Personal Payment SystemsJiadong Lou and Xu Yuan, University of Louisiana at Lafayette; Ning Zhang, Washington University in St. LouisUniversity of Louisiana at Lafayette美国
Research on the Security of Visual Reasoning CAPTCHA Yipeng Gao, Haichang Gao, Sainan Luo, Yang Zi, Shudong Zhang, Wenjie Mao, Ping Wang, and Yulong Shen,
Xidian University; Jeff Yan, Linköping University
Xidian University中国
Dirty Road Can Attack: Security of Deep Learning based Automated Lane Centering under
Physical-World Attack
Takami Sato, Junjie Shen, and Ningfei Wang, University of California, Irvine; Yunhan Jia, ByteDance; Xue Lin,
Northeastern University; Qi Alfred Chen, University of California, Irvine
University of California, Irvine美国
Domain Shadowing: Leveraging Content Delivery Networks for Robust Blocking-Resistant CommunicationsMingkui Wei, George Mason UniversityGeorge Mason University美国
Weaponizing Middleboxes for TCP Reflected AmplificationKevin Bock, University of Maryland; Abdulrahman Alaraj, University of Colorado Boulder; Yair Fax and Kyle Hurley,
University of Maryland; Eric Wustrow, University of Colorado Boulder; Dave Levin, University of Maryland
University of Maryland美国
Collective Information Security in Large-Scale Urban Protests: the Case of Hong KongMartin R. Albrecht, Jorge Blasco, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, and Lenka Mareková, Royal Holloway, University of LondonUniversity of London英国
How Great is the Great Firewall? Measuring China’s DNS CensorshipNguyen Phong Hoang, Stony Brook University and Citizen Lab, University of Toronto; Arian Akhavan Niaki, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst; Jakub Dalek, Jeffrey Knockel, and Pellaeon Lin, Citizen Lab, University of Toronto; Bill
Marczak, Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, and University of California, Berkeley; Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Citizen Lab,
University of Toronto; Phillipa Gill, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Michalis Polychronakis, Stony Brook University
University of Toronto加拿大
Balboa: Bobbing and Weaving around Network CensorshipMarc B. Rosen, James Parker, and Alex J. Malozemoff, Galois, Inc.Galois, Inc.美国
Once is Never Enough: Foundations for Sound Statistical Inference in Tor Network ExperimentationRob Jansen, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory; Justin Tracey and Ian Goldberg, University of WaterlooU.S. Naval Research Laboratory美国
Rollercoaster: An Efficient Group-Multicast Scheme for Mix NetworksDaniel Hugenroth, Martin Kleppmann, and Alastair R. Beresford, University of CambridgeUniversity of Cambridge英国
Obfuscation-Resilient Executable Payload Extraction From Packed MalwareBinlin Cheng, Hubei Normal University & Wuhan University; Jiang Ming, Erika A Leal, and Haotian Zhang,
The University of Texas at Arlington; Jianming Fu and Guojun Peng, Wuhan University; Jean-Yves Marion,
Université de Lorraine, CNRS, LORIA
Hubei Normal University & Wuhan University中国
DeepReflect: Discovering Malicious Functionality through Binary ReconstructionEvan Downing, Georgia Institute of Technology; Yisroel Mirsky, Georgia Institute of Technology & Ben-Gurion University;
Kyuhong Park and Wenke Lee, Georgia Institute of Technology
Georgia Institute of Technology美国
When Malware Changed Its Mind: An Empirical Study of Variable Program Behaviors in the Real WorldErin Avllazagaj, University of Maryland, College Park; Ziyun Zhu, Facebook; Leyla Bilge, NortonLifeLock Research
Group; Davide Balzarotti, EURECOM; Tudor Dumitras, University of Maryland, College Park
University of Maryland, College Park美国
The Circle Of Life: A Large-Scale Study of The IoT Malware LifecycleOmar Alrawi, Charles Lever, and Kevin Valakuzhy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Ryan Court and Kevin Snow,
Zero Point Dynamics; Fabian Monrose, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Manos Antonakakis,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Georgia Institute of Technology美国
Forecasting Malware Capabilities From Cyber Attack Memory ImagesOmar Alrawi, Moses Ike, Matthew Pruett, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Srimanta Barua, Taleb Hirani, Brennan Hill, and
Brendan Saltaformaggio, Georgia Institute of Technology
Georgia Institute of Technology美国
YarIx: Scalable YARA-based Malware Intelligence Michael Brengel and Christian Rossow, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information SecurityCISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
Constraint-guided Directed Greybox FuzzingGwangmu Lee, Seoul National University; Woochul Shim, Samsung Research; Byoungyoung Lee, Seoul National UniversitySeoul National University韩国
PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop Alexander Heinrich, Matthias Hollick, Thomas Schneider, Milan Stute, and Christian Weinert, TU DarmstadtTU Darmstadt德国
Privacy-Preserving and Standard-Compatible AKA Protocol for 5GYuchen Wang, TCA of State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
& Alibaba Group; Zhenfeng Zhang, TCA of State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese
Academy of Sciences; Yongquan Xie, Commercial Cryptography Testing Center of State Cryptography Administration
TCA of State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
& Alibaba Group
中国
SEApp: Bringing Mandatory Access Control to Android AppsMatthew Rossi, Dario Facchinetti, and Enrico Bacis, Università degli Studi di Bergamo; Marco Rosa, SAP Security
Research; Stefano Paraboschi, Università degli Studi di Bergamo
Università degli Studi di Bergamo意大利
A11y and Privacy don’t have to be mutually exclusive: Constraining Accessibility Service Misuse on AndroidJie Huang, Michael Backes, and Sven Bugiel, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information SecurityCISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
An Investigation of the Android Kernel Patch EcosystemZheng Zhang, UC RIverside; Hang Zhang and Zhiyun Qian, UC Riverside; Billy Lau, Google Inc.UC RIverside美国
Share First, Ask Later (or Never?) Studying Violations of GDPR’s Explicit Consent in Android AppsTrung Tin Nguyen, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Saarbrücken Graduate School of Computer Science,
Saarland University; Michael Backes, Ninja Marnau, and Ben Stock, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
DEFInit: An Analysis of Exposed Android Init RoutinesYuede Ji, University of North Texas; Mohamed Elsabagh, Ryan Johnson, and Angelos Stavrou, KryptowireUniversity of North Texas美国
Scalable Detection of Promotional Website Defacements in Black Hat SEO CampaignsRonghai Yang, Sangfor Technologies Inc.; Xianbo Wang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Cheng Chi, Dawei Wang,
Jiawei He, and Siming Pang, Sangfor Technologies Inc.; Wing Cheong Lau, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Sangfor Technologies Inc中国
Compromised or Attacker-Owned: A Large Scale Classification and Study of Hosting Domains of
Malicious URLs
Ravindu De Silva, SCoRe Lab and Qatar Computing Research Institute; Mohamed Nabeel, Qatar Computing Research
Institute; Charith Elvitigala, SCoRe Lab; Issa Khalil and Ting Yu, Qatar Computing Research Institute; Chamath
Keppitiyagama, University of Colombo School of Computing
SCoRe Lab and Qatar Computing Research Institute卡塔尔
Assessing Browser-level Defense against IDN-based PhishingHang Hu, Virginia Tech; Steve T.K. Jan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign/Virginia Tech; Yang Wang and
Gang Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Virginia Tech美国
Catching Phishers By Their Bait: Investigating the Dutch Phishing Landscape through Phishing Kit DetectionHugo Bijmans, Tim Booij, and Anneke Schwedersky, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO);
Aria Nedgabat, Eindhoven University of Technology; Rolf van Wegberg, Delft University of Technology
 Eindhoven University of Technology荷兰
PhishPrint: Evading Phishing Detection Crawlers by Prior Profiling Bhupendra Acharya and Phani Vadrevu, UNO Cyber Center, University of New OrleansUNO Cyber Center, University of New Orleans美国
Phishpedia: A Hybrid Deep Learning Based Approach to Visually Identify Phishing Webpages Yun Lin and Ruofan Liu, National University of Singapore; Dinil Mon Divakaran, Trustwave; Jun Yang Ng and Qing
Zhou Chan, National University of Singapore; Yiwen Lu, Yuxuan Si, and Fan Zhang, Zhejiang University; Jin Song Dong,
National University of Singapore
 National University of Singapore新加坡
Is Real-time Phishing Eliminated with FIDO? Social Engineering Downgrade Attacks against FIDO ProtocolsEnis Ulqinaku, ETH Zürich; Hala Assal, AbdelRahman Abdou, and Sonia Chiasson, Carleton University; Srdjan Capkun,
ETH Zürich
Carleton University加拿大
Jaqen: A High-Performance Switch-Native Approach for Detecting and Mitigating Volumetric DDoS Attacks with Programmable SwitchesZaoxing Liu, Boston University; Hun Namkung, Carnegie Mellon University; Georgios Nikolaidis, Jeongkeun Lee,
and Changhoon Kim, Intel, Barefoot Switch Division; Xin Jin, Peking University; Vladimir Braverman, Johns Hopkins
University; Minlan Yu, Harvard University; Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University
Boston University美国
ReDoSHunter: A Combined Static and Dynamic Approach for Regular Expression DoS DetectionYeting Li and Zixuan Chen, SKLCS, ISCAS, UCAS; Jialun Cao, HKUST; Zhiwu Xu, Shenzhen University; Qiancheng
Peng, SKLCS, ISCAS, UCAS; Haiming Chen, SKLCS, ISCAS; Liyuan Chen, Tencent; Shing-Chi Cheung, HKUST
SKLCS, ISCAS, UCAS中国
Ripple: A Programmable, Decentralized Link-Flooding Defense Against Adaptive AdversariesJiarong Xing, Wenqing Wu, and Ang Chen, Rice UniversityRice University美国
Accurately Measuring Global Risk of Amplification Attacks using AmpMapSoo-Jin Moon, Yucheng Yin, and Rahul Anand Sharma, Carnegie Mellon University; Yifei Yuan, Alibaba Group;
Jonathan M. Spring, CERT/CC, SEI, Carnegie Mellon University; Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University
Carnegie Mellon University美国
A Stealthy Location Identification Attack Exploiting Carrier Aggregation in Cellular NetworksNitya Lakshmanan and Nishant Budhdev, National University of Singapore; Min Suk Kang, KAIST; Mun Choon Chan
and Jun Han, National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore新加坡
Disrupting Continuity of Apple’s Wireless Ecosystem Security: New Tracking, DoS, and MitM Attacks on iOS
and macOS Through Bluetooth Low Energy, AWDL, and Wi-Fi 
Milan Stute, Alexander Heinrich, Jannik Lorenz, and Matthias Hollick, Technical University of DarmstadtTechnical University of Darmstadt德国
Stars Can Tell: A Robust Method to Defend against GPS Spoofing Attacks using Off-the-shelf ChipsetShinan Liu, University of Chicago; Xiang Cheng and Hanchao Yang, Virginia Tech; Yuanchao Shu, Microsoft Research;
Xiaoran Weng, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Ping Guo, City University of Hong Kong;
Kexiong (Curtis) Zeng, Facebook; Gang Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Yaling Yang, Virginia Tech
University of Chicago美国
Formally Verified Memory Protection for a Commodity Multiprocessor HypervisorShih-Wei Li, Xupeng Li, Ronghui Gu, Jason Nieh, and John Zhuang Hui, Columbia UniversityColumbia University美国
Automatic Policy Generation for Inter-Service Access Control of MicroservicesXing Li, Zhejiang University; Yan Chen, Northwestern University; Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University; Xiao Wang
and Jim Hao Chen, Northwestern University
Zhejiang University中国
CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking for Microservice DeploymentsXutong Chen, Northwestern University; Hassaan Irshad, SRI International; Yan Chen, Northwestern University;
Ashish Gehani and Vinod Yegneswaran, SRI International
Northwestern University美国
Virtual Secure Platform: A Five-Stage Pipeline Processor over TFHEKotaro Matsuoka, Ryotaro Banno, Naoki Matsumoto, Takashi Sato, and Song Bian, Kyoto UniversityKyoto University日本
Searching Encrypted Data with Size-Locked Indexes Min Xu, University of Chicago; Armin Namavari, Cornell University; David Cash, University of Chicago; Thomas
Ristenpart, Cornell Tech
University of Chicago美国
Blitz: Secure Multi-Hop Payments Without Two-Phase CommitsLukas Aumayr, TU Wien; Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, IMDEA Software Institute; Aniket Kate, Purdue University;
Matteo Maffei, TU Wien
TU Wien奥地利
Reducing HSM Reliance in Payments through Proxy Re-EncryptionSivanarayana Gaddam, Visa; Atul Luykx, Security Engineering Research, Google; Rohit Sinha, Swirlds Inc.; Gaven
Watson, Visa Research
Visa美国
Risky Business? Investigating the Security Practices of Vendors on an Online Anonymous Market using
Ground-Truth Data 
Jochem van de Laarschot and Rolf van Wegberg, Delft University of TechnologyDelft University of Technology荷兰
Deep Entity Classification: Abusive Account Detection for Online Social Networks Teng Xu, Gerard Goossen, Huseyin Kerem Cevahir, Sara Khodeir, and Yingyezhe Jin, Facebook, Inc; Frank Li,
Facebook, Inc, and Georgia Institute of Technology; Shawn Shan, Facebook, Inc, and University of Chicago; Sagar Patel
and David Freeman, Facebook, Inc; Paul Pearce, Facebook, Inc, and Georgia Institute of Technology
 Facebook, Inc美国
SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts Jeremiah Onaolapo, University of Vermont; Nektarios Leontiadis and Despoina Magka, Facebook; Gianluca Stringhini,
Boston University
University of Vermont美国
Understanding Malicious Cross-library Data Harvesting on AndroidJice Wang, National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences;
Indiana University Bloomington; Yue Xiao and Xueqiang Wang, Indiana University Bloomington; Yuhong Nan,
Purdue University; Luyi Xing and Xiaojing Liao, Indiana University Bloomington; JinWei Dong, School of Cyber
Engineering, Xidian University; Nicolas Serrano, Indiana University, Bloomington; Haoran Lu and XiaoFeng Wang,
Indiana University Bloomington; Yuqing Zhang, National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University
of Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University; School of Computer Science and
Cyberspace Security, Hainan University
 National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences中国
Swiped: Analyzing Ground-truth Data of a Marketplace for Stolen Debit and Credit Cards Maxwell Aliapoulios, Cameron Ballard, Rasika Bhalerao, Tobias Lauinger, and Damon McCoy, New York UniversityNew York University美国
Having Your Cake and Eating It: An Analysis of Concession-Abuse-as-a-ServiceZhibo Sun, Adam Oest, and Penghui Zhang, Arizona State University; Carlos Rubio-Medrano, Texas A&M University –
Corpus Christi; Tiffany Bao and Ruoyu Wang, Arizona State University; Ziming Zhao, Rochester Institute of Technology;
Yan Shoshitaishvili and Adam Doupé, Arizona State University; Gail-Joon Ahn, Arizona State University and Samsung
Research
Texas A&M University –
Corpus Christi
德国
Capture: Centralized Library Management for Heterogeneous IoT DevicesHan Zhang, Abhijith Anilkumar, Matt Fredrikson, and Yuvraj Agarwal, Carnegie Mellon UniversityCarnegie Mellon University美国
MPInspector: A Systematic and Automatic Approach for Evaluating the Security of IoT Messaging ProtocolsQinying Wang, Zhejiang University; Shouling Ji, Zhejiang University; Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University;
Yuan Tian, University of Virginia; Xuhong Zhang, Zhejiang University; Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University;
Binbin Zhao, Georgia Institute of Technology; Yuhong Kan and Zhaowei Lin, Zhejiang University; Changting Lin and
Shuiguang Deng, Zhejiang University; Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University; Alex X. Liu, Ant Group; Raheem Beyah,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Zhejiang University中国
HAWatcher: Semantics-Aware Anomaly Detection for Appified Smart HomesChenglong Fu, Temple University; Qiang Zeng, University of South Carolina; Xiaojiang Du, Temple UniversityTemple University美国
Exposing New Vulnerabilities of Error Handling Mechanism in CAN Khaled Serag and Rohit Bhatia, Purdue University; Vireshwar Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi; Z. Berkay Celik
and Dongyan Xu, Purdue University
Purdue University美国
CANARY – a reactive defense mechanism for Controller Area Networks based on Active RelaYs Bogdan Groza, Lucian Popa, and Pal-Stefan Murvay, Universitatea Politehnica Timisoara; Yuval Elovici and Asaf Shabtai,Ben-Gurion University of the NegevUniversitatea Politehnica Timisoara(蒂米什瓦拉理工学院)罗马尼亚
ReDMArk: Bypassing RDMA Security MechanismsBenjamin Rothenberger, Konstantin Taranov, Adrian Perrig, and Torsten Hoefler, ETH ZurichETH Zurich瑞士
ALPACA: Application Layer Protocol Confusion – Analyzing and Mitigating Cracks in TLS AuthenticationMarcus Brinkmann, Ruhr University Bochum; Christian Dresen, Münster University of Applied Sciences; Robert Merget,
Ruhr University Bochum; Damian Poddebniak, Münster University of Applied Sciences; Jens Müller, Ruhr University
Bochum; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University; Jörg Schwenk, Ruhr University Bochum; Sebastian Schinzel,
Münster University of Applied Sciences
Ruhr University Bochum德国
Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let’s EncryptHenry Birge-Lee and Liang Wang, Princeton University; Daniel McCarney, Square Inc.; Roland Shoemaker, unaffiliated;
Jennifer Rexford and Prateek Mittal, Princeton University
Princeton University美国
SiamHAN: IPv6 Address Correlation Attacks on TLS Encrypted Traffic via Siamese Heterogeneous Graph
Attention Network
Tianyu Cui, Gaopeng Gou, Gang Xiong, Zhen Li, Mingxin Cui, and Chang Liu, Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
中国
Why Eve and Mallory Still Love Android: Revisiting TLS (In)Security in Android Applications Marten Oltrogge, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Nicolas Huaman, Sabrina Amft, and Yasemin Acar,
Leibniz University Hannover; Michael Backes, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security; Sascha Fahl,
Leibniz University Hannover
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security德国
Why TLS is better without STARTTLS: A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email ContextDamian Poddebniak and Fabian Ising, Münster University of Applied Sciences; Hanno Böck, Independent Researcher;
Sebastian Schinzel, Münster University of Applied Sciences
Münster University of Applied Sciences德国
What’s in a Name? Exploring CA Certificate ControlZane Ma and Joshua Mason, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Manos Antonakakis, Georgia Institute of
Technology; Zakir Durumeric, Stanford University; Michael Bailey, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign美国
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