

# FUZE: Towards Facilitating Exploit Generation for Kernel Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities

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# What are We Talking about?

- Discuss the challenge of exploit development
- Introduce an approach to facilitate exploit development
- Demonstrate how the new technique facilitate mitigation circumvention



# Background

- All software contain bugs, and # of bugs grows with the increase of software complexity
  - E.g., Syzkaller/Syzbot reports 800+ Linux kernel bugs in 8 months
- Due to the lack of manpower, it is very rare that a software development team could patch all the bugs timely
  - E.g., A Linux kernel bug could be patched in a single day or more than 8 months; on average, it takes 42 days to fix one kernel bug
- The best strategy for software development team is to prioritize their remediation efforts for bug fix
  - E.g. based on its influence upon usability
  - E.g., based on its influence upon software security
  - E.g., based on the types of the bugs



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# Background (cont.)


- Most common strategy is to fix a bug based on its exploitability
- To determine the exploitability of a bug, analysts generally have to write a working exploit, which needs
  - 1) Significant manual efforts
  - 2) Sufficient security expertise
  - 3) Extensive experience in target software



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


# Crafting an Exploit for Kernel Use-After-Free




# Challenge 1: Needs Intensive Manual Efforts

- Analyze the kernel panic
- Manually track down
  1. The site of dangling pointer occurrence and the corresponding system call
  2. The site of dangling pointer dereference and the corresponding system call



# Challenge 2: Needs Extensive Expertise in Kernel


- Identify all the candidate objects that can be sprayed to the region of the freed object
- Pinpoint the proper system calls that allow an analyst to perform heap spray
- Figure out the proper arguments and context for the system call to allocate the candidate objects



# Challenge 3: Needs Security Expertise

- Find proper approaches to accomplish arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation or memory leakage
  - E.g., chaining ROP
  - E.g., crafting shellcode
  - ...

1. *Use control over program counter (rip) to perform arbitrary code execution*
2. *Use the ability to write arbitrary content to arbitrary address to escalate privilege*
3. ...



*kernel panic*



# Some Past Research Potentially Tackling the Challenges

- Approaches for Challenge 1
  - Nothing I am aware of, but simply extending KASAN could potentially solve this problem
- Approaches for Challenge 2
  - [Blackhat07] [CCS' 16] [USENIX-SEC18],...
- Approaches for Challenge 3
  - [NDSS'11] [S&P16], [S&P17],...

[NDSS'11] Avgerinos et al., AEG: Automatic Exploit Generation.

[CCS 16] Xu et al., From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel.

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[Blackhat07] Sotirov, Heap Feng Shui in JavaScript



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Problem unsolved.

- [NDSS'11] [S&P16], [S&P17]

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


# Roadmap

- **Unsolved challenges in exploitation facilitation**
- Our techniques -- FUZE
- Evaluation with real-world Linux kernel vulnerabilities
- Conclusion



# A Real-World Example (CVE-2017-15649)



```
1 void *task1(void *unused) {
2   ...
3   int err = setsockopt(fd, 0x107, 18,
4     ...);
5 }
6 void *task2(void *unused) {
7   int err = bind(fd, &addr, ...);
8 }
9
10 void loop_race() {
11   ...
12   while(1) {
13     fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW,
14       htons(ETH_P_ALL));
15     ...
16     //create two racing threads
17     pthread_create(&thread1, NULL,
18       task1, NULL);
19     pthread_create(&thread2, NULL,
20       task2, NULL);
21
22     pthread_join(thread1, NULL);
23     pthread_join(thread2, NULL);
24     close(fd);
25   }
26 }
```




# A Real-World Example (CVE-2017-15649)

*close(...) free node but not completely removed from the*

Head node

list



*dangling ptr*

```
1 void *task1(void *unused) {
2   ...
3   int err = setsockopt(fd, 0x107, 18,
4     ...);
5 }
6 void *task2(void *unused) {
7   int err = bind(fd, &addr, ...);
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24   }
25 }
```



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


# Challenge 4: No Primitive Needed for Exploitation

 Obtain an ability to write unmanageable data to unmanageable address

Head node

Node newly crafted



```
1 void *task1(void *unused) {
2   ...
3   int err = setsockopt(fd, 0x107, 18,
4     ↪ ..., ...);
5 }
6 void *task2(void *unused) {
7   int err = bind(fd, &addr, ...);
8 }
9
10 void loop_race() {
11   ...
12   while(1) {
13     fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW,
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24   }
25 }
```




# No Useful Primitive == Unexploitable??

Dangling ptr occurrence

Dangling ptr dereference

kernel panic



```
1 void *task1(void *unused) {
2   ...
3   int err = setsockopt(fd, 0x107, 18,
4     ↪ ..., ...);
5 }
6 void *task2(void *unused) {
7   int err = bind(fd, &addr, ...);
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
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
# FUZE – Extracting Critical Info.

- Identifying the site of dangling pointer occurrence, and that of its dereference; pinpointing the corresponding system calls



# FUZE – Performing Kernel Fuzzing

- Identifying the site of dangling pointer occurrence, and that of its dereference; pinpointing the corresponding system calls
- Performing kernel fuzzing between the two sites and exploring other panic contexts (i.e., different sites where the vulnerable object is dereferenced)





# Useful primitive identification

- Unconstrained state
  - state with symbolic Instruction pointer
  - symbolic callback
- double free
  - e.g. `mov rdi, uaf_obj; call kfree`
- write-what-where
  - e.g. write arbitrary value write

```
mov rax, qword ptr[evil_ptr]
call rax
```

stack pivot gadget:  
`xchg eax, esp; ret`

SMAP disable  
gadget:  
`mov cr4, rdi ; ret`



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# Case Study

- 15 real-world UAF kernel vulnerabilities
- Only 5 vulnerabilities have demonstrated their exploitability against SMEP
- Only 2 vulnerabilities have demonstrated their exploitability against SMAP

CVE-ID	# of public exploits		# of generated exploits	
	SMEP	SMAP	SMEP	SMAP
2017-17053	0	0	1	0
2017-15649*	0	0	3	2
2017-15265	0	0	0	0
2017-10661*	0	0	2	0
2017-8890	1	0	1	0
2017-8824*	0	0	2	2
2017-7374	0	0	0	0
2016-10150	0	0	1	0
2016-8655	1	1	1	1
2016-7117	0	0	0	0
2016-4557*	1	1	4	0
2016-0728*	1	0	3	0
2015-3636	0	0	0	0
2014-2851*	1	0	1	0
2013-7446	0	0	0	0
overall	5	2	19	5

\*: discovered new dereference by fuzzing



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# Case Study (cont)

- FUZE helps track down useful primitives, giving us the power to
  - Demonstrate exploitability against SMEP for 10 vulnerabilities
  - Demonstrate exploitability against SMAP for 2 more vulnerabilities
  - Diversify the approaches to perform kernel exploitation

- 5 vs 19 (SMEP)

- 2 vs 5 (SMAP)

CVE-ID	# of public exploits		# of generated exploits	
	SMEP	SMAP	SMEP	SMAP
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2017-15649	0	0	3	2
2017-15265	0	0	0	0
2017-10661	0	0	2	0
2017-8890	1	0	1	0
2017-8824	0	0	2	2
2017-7374	0	0	0	0
2016-10150	0	0	1	0
2016-8655	1	1	1	1
2016-7117	0	0	0	0
2016-4557	1	1	4	0
2016-0728	1	0	3	0
2015-3636	0	0	0	0
2014-2851	1	0	1	0
2013-7446	0	0	0	0
overall	5	2	19	5



# Discussion on Failure Cases

- Dangling pointer occurrence and its dereference tie to the same system call
- FUZE works for 64-bit OS but some vulnerabilities demonstrate its exploitability only for 32-bit OS
  - E.g., CVE-2015-3636
- Perhaps unexploitable!?
  - CVE-2017-7374 ← null pointer dereference
  - E.g., CVE-2013-7446, CVE-2017-15265 and CVE-2016-7117



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# Roadmap

- Unsolved challenges in exploitation facilitation
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# Conclusion

- Primitive identification and security mitigation circumvention can greatly influence exploitability
- Existing exploitation research fails to provide facilitation to tackle these two challenges
- Fuzzing + symbolic execution has a great potential toward tackling these challenges
- Research on exploit automation is just the beginning of the GAME! Still many more challenges waiting for us to tackle...



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# Thank you!


- Exploits and source code available at:
  - [https://github.com/ww9210/Linux\\_kernel\\_exploits](https://github.com/ww9210/Linux_kernel_exploits)
- Contact: wuwei@iie.ac.cn



# Questions



## FUZE



# Questions



## FUZE

